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Abstract
This study examines if and under which conditions corporate sustainability performance is
reflected in bank loan prices. By taking the sustainability performance of the lending bank
into account, I show that borrowers with strong sustainability performance pay lower loan
spreads than borrowers with weak sustainability performance, however only when the lending
bank exhibits strong sustainability performance. The findings hold across various method-
ological approaches including sample splits, interaction e↵ects, propensity score matching,
within-firm and within-bank di↵erences and while controlling for a wide range of possible
confounding e↵ects. The setting allows for a novel analysis of di↵erences within the same
borrowers across di↵erent banks as well as banks with di↵erent borrowers. I discuss three
explanatory mechanisms for the relationship: improved credit risk, increase in trust due to
similarity between banks and borrowers, and reputation risk. The study reveals that the
relationship between sustainability performance and loan prices is driven by a premium in
loan spreads for borrowers with weak sustainability performance, rather than a spread dis-
count for strong sustainability performance. I document that the results are not driven by
measurement error or selection of borrowers to banks. Consistent with the notion that the
availability of sustainability information and scrutiny have been increasing, the results of
this study reveal that the relationship between borrower sustainability performance and loan
pricing is stronger in more recent years.
Keywords: loan pricing, syndicated loans, sustainability, corporate social responsibility
- Preliminary draft. Please do not cite or distribute without authorization. -
Version 01.11.2017
⇤I am grateful for the comments and suggestions by Michael Barnett, Rob Bauer, Monique Donders,
Paul Healy, Jody Grewal, Jonas Heese, Stefanie Kleimeier, Christian Leuz, Frank Moers, Se´bastien Pouget,
Rachel Pownall, Paulo Rodrigues, Bert Scholtens, Franziska Sump, George Serafeim, and participants at the
German Finance Association Annual Meeting. I acknowledge financial support from the Ford Foundation
Programme on Purposeful Ownership. Corresponding author: Clarissa Hauptmann, Sa¨ıd Business School,
Oxford University, Park End St, Oxford OX1 1HP, UK. Contact email: clarissa.hauptmann@sbs.ox.ac.uk
1. Introduction
Over the recent years, waves of corporate scandals, fueled by a highly critical media,
have ignited a sharp rise in consumer and investor consciousness. News on unethical working
conditions and environmental pollution spread like wildfire, often resulting in serious conse-
quences for the respective firms. Sustainability is no longer dismissed as the fuzzy concern of
tree-huggers and hippies, but has become a key topic for many corporations. This is reflected
in the increasing number and depth of voluntary corporate sustainability reports, but also
in the rise in regulations and listings that mandate the disclosure of environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) e↵orts (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). Increasingly, banks are claim-
ing to take sustainability1 information into account in their lending, however the empirical
research remains inconclusive and with a strong focus on the borrower, while the bank as
the lending counterparty is often neglected. This is surprising, considering the growing sus-
tainability commitment of banks through internal policies or a liations such as the Equator
Principles. In early 2017 for example, HSBC Bank introduced a ’No Deforestation, No Peat,
No Exploitation’ policy guiding its lending policies in response to public pressures. This
study examines whether banks take the sustainability performance of their borrowers into
account when determining loan contract terms and uncovers the critical role of the bank’s
own sustainability performance in this context. Bank loans represent the most important
source of financing for many companies. Therefore, a strong understanding of the underlying
relationship provides insightful information on how the power of banks, as key drivers in the
economy, can be leveraged to drive sustainability.
Sustainability has been identified as a source of opportunity and lever for competitive
advantage. A large body of empirical research has revealed the direct e↵ects that Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) has on businesses, such as better access to valuable resources
(Waddock and Graves, 1997), improved media coverage (Cahan et al., 2015), and more op-
timistic analyst assessments (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Corporations with a long-term,
stakeholder-oriented perspective have been more successful at attracting socially responsible
consumers and shareholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Kapstein, 2001) and enjoy a higher
reputation and attractiveness as employers (Turban and Greening, 1997). A growing stream
of research has found that more socially and environmentally responsible firms are able to
capture these advantages and translate them into financial outperformance (Bragdon and
Marlin, 1972; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Brammer and Millington, 2008; Scholtens, 2009;
Flammer, 2013; Deng et al., 2013; Eccles et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2016), which in turn has
been documented to result in better access to capital (Bauer and Hann, 2010; Dhaliwal et al.,
2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Cheng et al., 2014; Chava, 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Kleimeier
and Viehs, 2016).
1The terms sustainability and ESG are used interchangeably in this study.
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In the past, the link between the shareholder equity side and ESG has been heavily stud-
ied by academics (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; David et al., 2007; Sjo¨stro¨m, 2008; Glac, 2014;
Grewal et al., 2017). Much however remains to be learned about the liability side. How do
debt holders, in particular banks, value the sustainability e↵orts of their borrowers? The
financial crisis of 2008 has severely damaged the reputation of financial institutions. This
has forced them to invest considerable resources in rebuilding their reputation and regaining
public trust. Large banks, such as Bank of America and Deutsche Bank, are now publishing
detailed sustainability reports in which they emphasize their commitment to sustainability
and responsible lending practices. In its 2015 sustainability report, Deutsche Bank states that
it is willing to decline new business opportunities if they do not meet the ethical standards
required from them: ”Business initiatives with a potentially negative e↵ect on the environ-
ment or society are subjected to painstaking scrutiny.” (Deutsche Bank, 2016). Deutsche
Bank emphasizes its commitment by the fact that a record high number of 1,346 transactions
were screened against environmental and social benchmarks in 2015. In a similar tone, Bank
of America signals its commitment by setting up a Global Corporate Social Responsibility
Governance Committee in 2014 dedicated to overseeing the bank’s sustainability initiatives.
The overall trend is an increase in commitment to and awareness of sustainability, both in
the financial and non-financial sectors.
This study begins by exploring the relationship between borrower sustainability perfor-
mance and bank loan spreads regardless of bank sustainability performance. In line with
some of the existing literature, I document that borrowers with strong sustainability perfor-
mance have better access to capital in terms of lower loan prices (Goss and Roberts, 2011;
Cheng et al., 2014; Chava, 2014; Kim et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2015; Hasan et al., 2017;
Kleimeier and Viehs, 2016). A one standard deviation improvement in borrower ESG per-
formance results in approximately 10.95 bps or almost 10% of the average syndicated loan
spread.2 Based on these findings, I analyze the role of the corresponding lending banks and
how their own commitment to sustainability drives this relationship. I find that borrower sus-
tainability performance is only beneficial to borrowers, in terms of lower loan spreads, when
the lending bank has high sustainability performance as well. A wide range of econometric
analyses provide evidence on this, including sample splits by bank sustainability performance
using seemingly unrelated regressions to compare coe cients, multivariate regression interac-
tion e↵ects between bank and borrower sustainability performance, propensity score match-
ing, and within-firm and within-bank spread variations. The within-firm and within-bank
tests shows that the di↵erence in spreads is driven by high-sustainability banks penalizing
low-sustainability borrowers with higher spreads, rather than by favoring high-sustainability
2Table 3 column (1) reveals a coe cient of -53.74 for borrower ESG performance on spread. A one standard
deviation of borrower ESG performance is 0.20, hence 0.20 ⇥  53.74 = 10.95. The average syndicated loan
spread in the sample is 128.48.
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borrowers with lower spreads. I document an average spread di↵erence of 56.01 bps between
borrowers with low and high sustainability performance, for the same bank with strong sus-
tainability performance. As borrowers may select to certain banks, I control for the number
of di↵erent banks that borrowers receive loans from, as a measure of access to bank loans
and dependence on individual banks. The results hold also for a subsample of the top quar-
tile most unconstrained borrowers. Furthermore, I address measurement error by using an
alternative sustainability performance data source, KLD instead of Asset4 data, and addi-
tionally grouping categories into sustainability strengths and weaknesses through principal
component analysis instead of using an ESG score. To further understand the underlying
reasons for this finding, the time dynamics of this relationship are explored. Consistent with
our expectation that sustainability has become more important over time due to both the
increase in sustainability disclosures and scrutiny on banks, the results reveal that the e↵ect
is stronger in more recent years.
Summarizing, this study reveals that the relationship between strong sustainability perfor-
mance and lower loan spreads is driven by banks with high sustainability performance. High
sustainability performance is rewarded in terms of a reduction in penalty for borrowers. The
relationship is stronger in more recent periods. I discuss that this is likely to be driven by the
increase in scrutiny and reputation risk for banks, but also improved credit risk assessment
and cultural similarity between banks and borrowers with similar ESG performance.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. To date, studies have focused
on aggregate borrower sustainability performance but also individual aspects of ESG perfor-
mance and how these factors mediate access to debt financing. The general notion is that
sustainability performance a↵ects loan conditions through changes in credit risk. However,
considering that bank loans are contractual obligations negotiated between two parties, sur-
prisingly little attention has been given to the role of banks in this context. This is the first
study to take into account the sustainability performance of banks in the context of borrower
sustainability and access to debt capital. Creditworthiness of borrowers is assessed through
hard and soft information criteria which require interpretation by the corresponding bank.
Consequently, assessments may be subject to biases due to certain experiences or values and
di↵er between banks accordingly. As an example, imagine a prospective borrower that has
superior sustainability performance, particularly in terms of environmental performance. A
bank that values and understands the implications of environmental performance is likely to
take this aspect of the borrower into account, compared to a bank that does not care or be-
lieve in value-e↵ects of ESG on performance. Consequently, considering bank sustainability
commitment is necessary in order to fully understand the underlying mechanisms. Beyond
validating the relationship between sustainability performance and loan spreads, as discussed
in previous literature, in this study I disentangle the relationship with the lending bank to
better understand how and why firms with stronger sustainability performance attain more
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favorable loan spreads on average. The findings in this study have significant practical im-
plications, as they provide evidence on the source of price di↵erentiation, namely in terms of
a reduction in penalty for borrowers with weak sustainability performance. From a research
standpoint, being able to point out the angle of spread di↵erentiation clarifies the source of
correlation and provides insights into causality. By gaining a deeper understanding of the
dynamics between bank and borrower ESG performance, I help to uncover the role of finan-
cial institutions in promoting sustainability. This is extremely important as there is ”much
more scope for finance to promote socially and environmentally desirable activities and to
discourage detrimental activities than has been acknowledged in the academic literature so
far” (Scholtens, 2006). Up to now, research has been centered around the equity side and
influence of shareholders on sustainability outcomes. As bank loans are one of the most
important sources of capital, understanding the role of debt capital providers, particularly
banks, in this context is highly important and a central contribution of this paper. My find-
ings highlight to policy makers the importance of encouraging sustainability in the finance
sector, because only banks that are thoughtful and vigilant about sustainability and related
issues consider, act on, and hence are likely to promote sustainability. The former Chairman
of Barclays Bank, Sir David Walker, claimed: ”A successful, vibrant finance and banking
sector is an essential enabler of social and economic progress, growth and development”.
Only with a strong understanding of the subject matter will financial institutions be able to
maximize their potential as key drivers in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
sustainability and financial performance, access to capital, and the role of banks. Section 3
introduces the data and provides the descriptive statistics. In section 4 the methodology is
discussed and empirical results are presented. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
The recent spike in public interest on understanding and promoting corporate sustain-
ability performance has largely been motivated by the prospect of capturing a competitive
advantage and ultimately generating financial outperformance. Consequently, most of the
existing academic literature focuses on the relationship between sustainability and financial
performance, primarily in terms of book- and market value of the firm. More recently, the
scrutiny on the equity side has been shifted over to the liability side, revealing insightful
information on the relevance of di↵erent ESG factors on access to debt capital. I begin by
delivering an overview of the development of research in CSR and financial performance,
followed by the more recent research on the liability side. Finally, I provide the theoretical
hypothesis development.
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2.1. Sustainability and financial performance
Almost 50 years have passed since Friedman (1970) first ignited the debate on corporate
social responsibility with his controversial statement that the only social responsibility a firm
has, is to increase its profits. In his famous New York Times article, he condemns corporate
social responsibility as a misallocation of shareholder funds and suggests to separate out
social goals by financing them privately. Researchers were quick to follow-up with empirical
evidence: The first studies on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and firm
performance were published by Bragdon and Marlin (1972) and Moskowitz (1972). Bragdon
and Marlin (1972) provide initial evidence on a positive relationship between environmental
sustainability and financial performance in the context of pollution control. Around the same
time, Moskowitz (1972) analyzes a selection of socially responsible companies more deeply
and finds that they are able to financially outperform their peers. In the decades following,
academics and practitioners have struggled to understand the impact of corporate social
responsibility on organizational behavior and ultimately on how it a↵ects a firm’s bottom
line.
To date, most empirical findings support the notion that more sustainable firms are re-
warded with higher financial performance or at least not penalized with worst performance.
The literature explores di↵erent measures of sustainability - from environmental, social, and
governance measures, to charitable giving, inclusion in sustainability indexes and other more
aggregate proxies of sustainability. Cochran and Wood (1984) show that within di↵erent in-
dustry groups, firms with higher corporate social responsibility ratings outperform their peers
financially. They use various measures for financial outperformance, including operating earn-
ings to sales, operating earnings to assets, and excess value. Waddock and Graves (1997)
postulate that corporate social performance depends on resource availability and therefore
firms with higher prior financial performance outperform socially as they have the capacity
to invest in social advancements. They also find that good social performance results in
better future financial performance and discuss two possible mechanisms for this link. First,
it may be driven by the proactive nature of sustainability which recognizes problematic do-
mains before they become an issue. Second, engaging in social responsibility may be a tool
to boost reputation, employee and shareholder relations which translate into higher financial
performance. In one of the earliest comprehensive studies on sustainability and financial
performance, Preston and O’Bannon (1997) discuss a range of possible causal sequences.
They find no evidence for a negative correlation, but instead they find a positive relationship
between social and financial performance for large US firms, in favor of stakeholder value the-
ory. Heal (2005) discusses that CSR can improve corporate profits and reduce reputational
risk. He claims that it is especially important when there are conflicts of interest. Brammer
and Millington (2008) add the time dimension to the existing research and show that in the
short-run, firms with low social performance outperform financially, while in the long-run
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social performance pays o↵. Bauer et al. (2008) investigate the governance dimension and
find that good corporate governance is beneficial in the Japanese setting. Guenster et al.
(2011) show that there is a positive link between eco-e ciency and operating performance
as well as market value. Becchetti et al. (2012) find that on average, firms that exit the
Domini 400 social index su↵er from negative abnormal returns, indicating that shareholders
value social engagement. Flammer (2013) conducts an event study around announcements
on environmental news and finds that positive news is related with a positive stock market
reaction while negative news results in a drop in the share price. Using the setting of mergers
and acquistions, Deng et al. (2013) find that high CSR acquirers have better merger an-
nouncement returns, higher long-run stock performance, and achieve faster, more successful
mergers. Eccles et al. (2014) show that social performance is related to better stock market
and accounting performance, more non-financial disclosure, a longer-term orientation, and
increased stakeholder engagement processes. Furthermore, they find that the board of di-
rectors is more likely to be responsible for sustainability, and top executive compensation
is a function of sustainability metrics for firms with higher CSR performance. Serafeim
(2014) summarizes that collectively his research indicates that financial performance and
sustainability are not mutually exclusive: By adopting a long-term horizon, understanding
the materiality of sustainability issues, regulations, societal expectations, innovation, and
corporate governance it is possible to achieve financial outperformance through sustainabil-
ity. Gollier and Pouget (2014) coin the term ”washing machine” strategy as the method of
gaining positive abnormal returns by investing in non-responsible firms and turning them
more responsible. Pouget (2014) argues that positive and negative SRI screening strategies
can only produce benefits when markets are not fully e cient. With active strategies, such
as with the ”washing machine”, investors are able to produce more reliable positive financial
outcomes. Similarly, Fatemi et al. (2015) show that under certain conditions, CSR expen-
ditures can lead to shareholder value creation that can even o↵set the upfront costs of CSR
engagement in the intermediate and long term. Kru¨ger (2015) identifies that stock markets
react negatively to positive CSR news, when agency problems persist. They react more fa-
vorably when agency problems are less likely to be present. Ferrell et al. (2016) show that
firms with strong governance systems in place exhibit better sustainability performance and
a better alignment of sustainability and financial performance.
Metastudies by Margolis and Walsh (2003), Orlitzky et al. (2003), Margolis et al. (2007),
and more recently Friede et al. (2015) reveal that most empirical evidence indicates a posi-
tive relationship between social and financial performance, with the link being stronger for
accounting-based measures than for market-based ones. A few, less recent studies oppose this
relationship: Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that sin stocks - public companies involved
in alcohol, tobacco, and gaming - financially outperform their peers. This may be driven by
the fact that they are in industries with low cyclicality, resulting in more stable cash flows
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especially during market downturns. Renneboog et al. (2008) discuss that SRI investors may
be willing to accept sub-optimal financial performance to pursue social or ethical objectives,
although they do not find a significant di↵erence in performance. From their survey of the
existing literature at the time, they conclude that the causality between CSP and CSR is
not fully understood yet. Finally, Surroca and Tribo´ (2008) show that in the case when
managers are entrenched and implement socially responsible actions, this has negative e↵ects
on financial performance.
Although it appears that most research to date supports the positive link between sustain-
ability performance and financial performance, the underlying mechanisms have not yet been
clearly established. Hence, this makes it particularly relevant to understand the transmission
channels of performance and motivates research into the related field of debt financing.
2.2. Sustainability and bank loan contracting
A relationship between corporate sustainability performance and financial performance
postulates that corporate sustainability performance must be fundamentally linked to the
underlying cash flows of the firm. With debt contracting being highly dependent on cash flow
stability and creditworthiness, this naturally motivates research on the relationship between
ESG performance and bank loan financing. This is a particularly important topic considering
the huge economic significance of the bank loan market in which slight changes in loan
conditions can result in massive re-allocations of capital. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) reveal
that corporate governance matters for loan conditions. They find that firms with greater
institutional ownership and stronger outside board control receive lower bond yields and
higher ratings due to a reduction in agency costs. Goss and Roberts (2011) find that firms
with social responsibility concerns pay more on their bank debt. They discuss two opposing
views. On the one hand, the risk mitigation view postulates that CSR reduces idiosyncratic
risk exposure, which can translate into better creditworthiness. On the other hand, according
to the overinvestment view, managers benefit from overinvestment in CSR at the expense of
capital providers. In this case, good CSP does not result in better credit conditions. Their
empirical results reveal that the risk reduction view outweighs, and CSR concerns have a
negative impact on bank loan conditions. In other words, superior CSR performance is
related to better loan conditions. Similarly, Chava (2014) who looks more specifically at
environmental concerns, finds that these are related to a higher cost of debt and equity.
With more lenders adopting environmentally sensitive lending policies, lenders may refuse to
lend to certain firms that lack environmental responsibility, as this may pose a reputation risk
for them. Other studies that focus on the environmental dimension of sustainability include
Bauer and Hann (2010) and Sharfman and Fernando (2008). Bauer and Hann (2010) show
that environmental concerns are associated with a significantly higher cost of debt financing
and lower credit ratings. They find that proactive environmental practices are associated
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with a lower cost of debt. Similarly, Sharfman and Fernando (2008) reveal that improved
environmental risk is associated with a lower cost of capital, a shift from equity to debt
capital, and associated tax benefits from adding debt. Kim et al. (2014) find that ethical
behavior is related to better syndicated loan spreads and that the similarity in ethical domain
between the borrower and bank improves loan conditions. Instead of focusing on spreads,
Shi and Sun (2015) look at the number of loan covenants and find that a high CSR score
is related to less bond covenants, more financial flexibility and generally less restrictions.
Their results are strongest for traded bonds with potential agency problems and high bid-ask
spreads. Aiming at improving our understanding of the transmission channel, Stellner et al.
(2015) analyze credit risk in terms of credit ratings and z-spreads. They find that good social
performance is only seen as risk-reducing when it is recognized by the environment, measured
as country social performance. Finally, Cheng et al. (2015) find that higher social capital in
terms of involvement in community activities on the county level is indicative of better bank
loan spreads.
2.3. Theoretical hypothesis development
Negotiations are important in establishing loan contract terms, especially so in the syndi-
cated loan market (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012). Therefore, when examining loan negotiation
contracts it is important to consider both parties of the transaction. This study extends
the literature on the relationship between corporate sustainability performance and cost of
debt by taking into account the role of the lending bank’s sustainability performance. Doing
so enables us to explore the channels as to why lenders value sustainability performance in
their borrowers, providing valuable insights into how and when it is beneficial to engage in
sustainability measures.
An increasing number of banks are claiming their heightened awareness of social re-
sponsibility in their role as financial intermediaries. This has resulted in increased voluntary
reporting on sustainability e↵orts within firms and CSR reports are becoming common place.
Currently more than 90% of the world’s largest 250 corporations report on their sustainabil-
ity performance (GRI, 2016). Furthermore, initiatives such as the Sustainability Account-
ing Standards Borad (SASB), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Principles for Responsi-
ble Investment (PRI), and the Equator Principles have been driving the transparency and
comparability of sustainability e↵orts. SASB, for example, has developed industry-specific
sustainability reporting standards to increase transparency and comparability in reporting.
Their guidelines are investor-focused and designed to channel attention to those sustainability
issues that are material for the respective firm. Similarly, the GRI sets guidelines for sus-
tainability reports to help communicate the impact that organizations have on environmental
and social outcomes. Their stakeholder-oriented guidelines provide the most widely used sus-
tainability reporting standards in the world, with more than 7,500 organizations making use
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of them. From an investment management perspective, the PRI promote six main principles
that encourage investors to use a voluntary set of investment principles with the objective
to incorporate ESG factors into their investment practice. Currently there are more than
1,500 signatories from over 50 countries with approximately 60 trillion USD assets under
management. Finally, also with the aim of promoting corporate sustainability awareness, the
Equator Principles is a risk management framework specifically for financial institutions with
the goal of determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects.
It sets a minimum standard for due diligence in responsible risk decision-making. Over the
last decade, sustainability has become central to organizations, and finance providers are
beginning to understand their responsibility in providing capital in a conscientious fashion.
In contrast to equity capital, bank debt generates new finance in a concentrated manner
that enables stronger control and monitoring (Scholtens, 2006). Consequently, banks have
a wide-reaching scope of improving sustainability in businesses. In recent years, banks are
increasingly implementing screening criteria in their decision-making process and disclosing
information on their sustainability initiatives in their sustainability reports, websites, and
other sources of media communication.
The recent literature has revealed that superior sustainability performance not only pays
o↵ for non-financial institutions, but that banks also reap benefits. Simpson and Kohers
(2002) investigate the relationship between social and financial performance for a subset of
banks and find that the positive link between social and financial performance holds for them
as well. Although Chih et al. (2010) do not find significant results on this relationship for
a broad set of international firms from the financial industry, they do find that financial
institutions engage more in CSR when competition is more intense, in order to gain a com-
petitive advantage. Wu and Shen (2013) discuss three potential driving motives for banks to
engage in CSR: Strategic choice, altruism, and greenwashing. Their results show that bank
CSR performance is related to higher financial performance and less non-performing loans,
indicating that strategic choice is the primary motive for banks to pursue CSR. Despite it
being a strategic and not altruistic choice, Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2014) conclude that eth-
ical banks improve welfare by implementing projects with positive externalities on society
while themselves benefiting from lower default rates. Scholtens (2009) reveals that the social
responsibility of banks has improved in the years 2000 to 2005 and is related to banks having
become signatories to more codes of conduct, improved transparency on social responsibility,
and the expansion in variety of responsible financial products. Considering that the existing
literature shows that CSR a↵ects banks operating and financing performance, it seems highly
relevant to take bank sustainability into account when examining the relationship between
corporate sustainability performance and access to bank debt.
I hypothesize that banks with high sustainability performance price the sustainability ef-
forts of their borrowers into the bank loan contracts more than banks with low sustainability
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Figure 1: Why does bank sustainability performance matter?
performance. I identify three main underlying mechanisms for this. First, strong sustain-
ability performance may reduce credit risk and banks with strong sustainability performance
may be better able to value this. Second, banks and borrowers with similar sustainability
performance may have greater trust between each other, reducing information asymmetries
and hence loan prices. Finally, banks with strong sustainability performance may care about
the sustainability of their borrowers more, due to the reputation risk that they are exposed
to. In this case, a borrower with sustainability concerns may a↵ect the reputation of the
lending bank. The next sections discuss these three channels in more detail.
2.3.1. Recognition of credit risk
According to the risk mitigation view by Goss and Roberts (2011), sustainability e↵orts
reduce risk exposure and hence can improve credit risk. Supporting their reasoning, Lee and
Fa↵ (2009) show that investing in a portfolio with high CSR performing firms results in less
idiosyncratic risk. Firms with high ESG performance also tend to be more long-term oriented
(Eccles et al., 2014). Consequently, managers may be less tempted to boost the share price
with risky, myopic actions and instead focus on long-term projects. This can result in favor to
creditors, as these firms shift away from a short-term share price maximization perspective, to
a longer-term profitability view. Furthermore, sustainable borrowers may be exposed to fewer
legal fines e.g. due to environmental catastrophes. Such fines directly impact cash flows and
are reflected in a decline in creditworthiness. Along the same lines, employee and customer
relationships tend to be more stable when the motivation to work at a specific company or buy
from a particular brand is not purely price-driven but rather by a socially conscious worker
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or consumer (Turban and Greening, 1997; Greening and Turban, 2000). In other words,
this means that both reduced consumer price elasticity as well as employee turnover improve
cash flow stability and hence the creditworthiness of the firm. Furthermore, in a society
of increasing consumer awareness, the media plays a significant role in communicating to
stakeholders. Due to the fact that sustainability performance is positively related to media
coverage (Cahan et al., 2015), this can positively influence customer loyalty and, through
reduced consumer price elasticity, the firm’s cash flow stability. Due to all of the above,
sustainability can reduce credit risk. However, this is only reflected in the loan conditions
when it is actually recognized by the lender. Stellner et al. (2015) find that in the context
of country-specific sustainability, social responsibility e↵orts are only beneficial when they
are recognized by the environment that they operate in. Similarly, bank ESG performance
can be seen as a major part of the operating environment of the borrower. As Barigozzi and
Tedeschi (2014) discuss, ethical banks prefer to fund projects that are more ethical, reducing
loan default rates at the same time. If they are more skilled at valuing these advantages of
superior ESG performance due to their own ESG performance, this will be reflected in the
loan spreads.
2.3.2. Cultural similarity
The second reason as to why the advantage of borrower sustainability performance may
depend on that of the lending bank is cultural similarity which can increase trust and reduce
prices. When both bank and borrower have a similar attitude towards sustainability, there
is a higher level of trust in the relationship. This reduces information frictions, resulting in
lower loan spreads. Lewicki et al. (1998) discuss that convergent interests provide a solid
foundation for trust, in terms of a positive expectation on the desired behavior. Similarly,
Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) find in their review of the trust literature, that shared character-
istics between two parties increase trust. This also holds true for the specific case of group
membership: Williams (2001) reveals that group membership impacts the beliefs about group
members’ trustworthiness. The existing literature indicates that similarity in sustainability
may increase trust, whether measured as convergence in interests (Lewicki et al., 1998),
shared characteristics (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012), or group membership (Williams, 2001).
Building on this, a related strand of literature indicates that trust is important in the set-
ting of bank loan contracts. Here, information asymmetries play a major role (Dennis and
Mullineaux, 2000). When information asymmetries and agency problems are severe, loans
contain additional and more restrictive covenants (Drucker and Puri, 2009). In their study,
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) establish that trust indeed plays a central role in loan contract-
ing. In fact, trust has been found to reduce the perceived probability of losses (Nooteboom
et al., 1997). Studies to date indicate that trust and similarity may improve access to fi-
nance. Trust has been found to reduce credit constraints in SMEs (Moro and Fink, 2013).
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Bottazzi et al. (2016) reveal that venture capitalists are more likely to fund entrepreneurs
in countries whose citizens they trust more. Focusing on syndicated bank loans, Giannetti
and Yafeh (2012) find that a higher cultural distance between borrower and lead arranging
bank increases loan spreads, limits the loan size, and reduces risk sharing. Most related to
this line of reasoning is the work of Kim et al. (2014). They find that loan spreads are more
favorable for borrowers when bank and borrower exhibit ethical similarity, as this helps to
reduce capital market frictions. When lenders and borrowers are similar, information fric-
tions are reduced, and familiarity as well as trust in non-opportunistic behavior between the
parties increases (Kim et al., 2014). This results in lower costs of formalizing transactions
and reduced monitoring costs. Hence, if a smaller cultural ESG distance results in reduced
information asymmetries, this could be reflected in lower bank loan spreads.
2.3.3. Reputation risk
A third channel is that banks with high sustainability performance may seek to protect
their reputation from shocks that may occur through lending to irresponsible borrowers.
For example, if a bank with a reputation for excellent sustainability behavior provides loans
to a firm that reveals major sustainability issues, this can reflect negatively on the bank
and result in a damage to its reputation. This, in turn, can lead to damages to financial
performance and access to credit for the bank (Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Wu and Shen,
2013; Barigozzi and Tedeschi, 2014). Consequently, high sustainability-performing banks may
require a premium to lend to low sustainability-performing borrowers to compensate for the
reputation risk they face. These same banks are more willing to provide capital to borrowers
with high sustainability behavior. The existing literature reveals that superior corporate
social performance enhances corporate reputation (Fombrun et al., 2000). Particularly firms
with a high exposure to litigation risk can be shielded by superior social performance from
shocks in firm value (Koh et al., 2014) and insured from downside risk at no cost (Peloza,
2006). This is highly important for financial intermediaries, as they are only able to act as
credible information producers if they have a good reputation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri,
1994). In the syndicated loan market, loans are more likely to be syndicated when the
syndicate’s managing agent is more reputable (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). Banks are
highly scrutinized by the media and government regarding their social performance, due to
their key role in the economy and the fact that they employ public resources paid for by
society (Wu and Shen, 2013). Consequently, bank reputation may be especially sensitive to
sustainability performance shocks. Therefore, banks with high sustainability performance
may require a higher spread premium when lending to borrowers with low sustainability
performance to o↵set for the reputation risk they take on.
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3. Data and Sample
3.1. Sample construction
The sample is constructed by combining data from LPC DealScan, Orbis Data Solutions,
Thomson Reuters Asset4, and Thomson Reuters Eikon. Detailed data on the syndicated
loans is retrieved from LPC DealScan. DealScan is considered the ”world’s number one
source for comprehensive, reliable historical deal information on the global loan markets”
(Reuters, 2015). The database includes detailed loan contract terms such as the loan spread,
maturity, deal size, and seniority of the loan. In addition, it provides information on the loan
purpose, tranche type, and senior debt rating. Borrowing firm characteristics are gathered
from Orbis Data Solutions. Orbis provides a comprehensive source of management and fi-
nancial statement data on over 160 million listed and unlisted firms worldwide. It combines
data from several renowned databases including Reach, Amadeus, Osiris, and Bankscope.
Sustainability data is collected for both the lending banks and the borrowing firms from
Thomson Reuters Asset4. Asset4 is a Swiss-based firm that uses more than 250 key perfor-
mance indicators and over 750 individual data points along with their original data sources
to determine the environmental, social, and governance performance of companies. These
three major categories cover the key topics as follows: The environmental dimension con-
siders resource, innovation, and emissions data. The social performance measure integrates
employment quality, health and safety, but also diversity, product responsibility, and human
rights. Governance is assessed by considering compensation, shareholder rights, board com-
position and strategy. The ESG data is collected from public sources (e.g. annual reports,
sustainability reports, NGO websites) and transformed to consistent units by Asset4 analysts.
Updates occur on a bi-weekly basis. Asset4 data is used by professional investors who are
interested in integrating sustainability factors into their analysis. Currently, an estimate of
2.5 trillion in assets under management employ this data (Cheng et al., 2014).
The sample selection begins with the Asset4 universe of 6,140 firms and banks; going
back to the first year of coverage, 2002, approximately 1000 firms are covered. This data is
merged with LPC DealScan, then non-US firms and firms that do not have required financial
information are removed. Only syndicated loans are included that have a single lead arranger,
in order to clearly identify the lead arranging bank and relevant lender sustainability perfor-
mance. The final sample covers 484 unique borrowing firms and 39 unique lending banks,
resulting in 1,226 loan observations from 2002 to 2015. Table 1 provides the frequency dis-
tributions of the data. Panel A reveals the distribution across sectors and Panel B provides
the distribution across years.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the key variables are presented in Table 2 Panel A. The ESG
performance falls within the range of 0 to 100%, where 100% represents the highest sustain-
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Table 1: Frequency distributions
Panel A: Industry
SIC Industry classification N loans
1 Mining and construction 142
2 Manufacturing food, textile, lumber, publishing, chemicals, petroleum 193
3 Manufacturing plastics, leather, concrete, metal, machinery, equipment 253
4 Transportation, communications, electric, gas, sanitary services 146
5 Trade 139
6 Finance, insurance, real estate 211
7 Personal, business, and entertainment services 92
8 Professional services 50
Total 1,226
Panel B: Years
Year N loans
2002 136
2003 93
2004 124
2005 151
2006 109
2007 94
2008 114
2009 57
2010 66
2011 71
2012 68
2013 58
2014 44
2015 41
Total 1,226
Notes: The table provides an overview of the frequency distribution of loan observations included in this study
by SIC major industry group of the borrowing firms in Panel A, and by year of loan syndication, in Panel B.
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ability performance. The sustainability performance is available for each borrower and bank
on an annual basis and is sub-divided into the subcategories environmental, social, and gov-
ernance performance. The table reveals that the sustainability performance of the borrowers
is on average slightly lower than that of the banks: While the mean borrower sustainability
performance is 50%, that of the banks is on average higher at 75%. In all subcategories of
sustainability measures, the borrower sustainability performance is on average lower than
that of the banks. The standard deviation of scores however is higher for the borrowers
than for the banks. This appears to be driven by the larger downside variation in borrower
sustainability scores.
With regard to the borrower characteristics, firms size is measured as ln(total assets) with
a mean at 15.82, equivalent to 27MM. The EBIT margin is on average 0.16 with a minimum
of -1.79 and maximum of 3.49. The market to book value is at 3.96%, which seems low but
is driven by negative market to book ratios. Negative book ratios can occur after strings of
negative earnings and this a↵ects about 1% of our sample Leverage is measured as total debt
to assets and is on average 27.36%. Stock price volatility is at 28%. Tangibility is represented
by the log of net tangible assets to total assets with its mean is at a ratio of -1.16.
The main loan characteristic of interest is the loan spread, measured by the All-in-spread
drawn. This is the amount that the borrower pays over the LIBOR, including any fees. It is
on average 128.48 bps and ranges from 0 to 850 bps. This is similar to the existing literature
such as Goss and Roberts (2011) who find an average spread of 101 bps and Kleimeier and
Viehs (2016) with 238 bps. All loans included in this sample have one lead arranger and one
borrower. About 21% of the loans are secured. Number of lenders is provided in logs, on
average 1.82 or approximately 9 lenders. The loan maturity is on average 38 months and
ranges from 3 to 120 months. This is similar to Maskara (2010) and Lim et al. (2014) who find
average maturities of 58 and 46 months, respectively. The loan tranche size is measured in
logs and has a mean of 19.7. The table reveals that 45% of loans are performance priced. The
covenants indicator variable reveals that the majority of the loans have covenants attached.
Panel B of Table 2 visualizes the average loan spread for di↵erent combinations of banks
and borrowers in a matrix. The upper matrix splits the sample by median bank ESG per-
formance, while the lower matrix goes further into the tails of the distribution and captures
the quartiles. High borrower ESG is classified as zero if the borrower’s sustainability perfor-
mance is in the bottom quartile (or below median), and it is coded as one when sustainability
performance is in the top quartile (or above median). Similarly, high bank ESG is zero when
bank sustainability performance is in the lower quartile (or below median) and one if it is
in the top quartile (or above median). A mean-di↵erence t-test reveals the univariate di↵er-
ence in spreads for these combinations. The table provides a first understanding of the data
and shows that banks with high ESG performance provide higher loan spreads on average
to borrowers with low ESG performance. Considering the quartile-split matrix and without
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ESG characteristics
Borrower ESG score 1,226 0.50 0.20 0.09 0.97
Borrower ENV score 1,226 0.37 0.28 0.09 0.97
Borrower SOC score 1,226 0.40 0.27 0.04 0.98
Borrower GOV score 1,226 0.73 0.17 0.03 0.97
Bank ESG score 1,226 0.75 0.14 0.24 0.96
Bank ENV score 1,226 0.76 0.26 0.10 0.97
Bank SOC score 1,226 0.72 0.20 0.12 0.99
Bank GOV score 1,226 0.79 0.11 0.08 0.96
Borrower characteristics
Firm size 1,226 15.82 1.36 12.05 20.84
EBIT 1,226 0.16 0.21 -1.79 3.49
MTB 1,226 3.96 27.51 -157.84 901.66
Leverage 1,226 27.36 17.53 0.00 69.26
Pricevol 1,226 28.10 9.00 11.68 66.13
Tangibility 1,226 -1.16 0.75 -5.76 -0.14
Loan characteristics
Spread 1,226 128.48 113.70 0.00 850.00
Secured 1,226 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Numlenders 1,226 1.82 1.00 0.00 3.50
Maturity 1,226 38.54 22.44 3.00 120.00
Loansize 1,226 19.70 1.15 16.31 22.36
Perfpricing 1,226 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Covenants 1,226 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Bank-borrower spread matrix
Median split: High borrower ESG Low borrower ESG t-statistic
High bank ESG 121.98 160.98 4.07
Low bank ESG 100.78 130.98 3.53
t-statistic 2.42 3.22
Quartile split: High borrower ESG Low borrower ESG t-statistic
High bank ESG 91.06 175.96 5.27
Low bank ESG 83.71 146.76 1.19
t-statistic 0.40 4.56
Notes: The tables provide an overview of the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in this study.
Panel A reveals the summary statistics. The matrix in Panel B shows the average loan spread for the respective
bank-borrower ESG combinations. The t-statistic refers to the mean di↵erence between the spread of high
and low borrower ESG categories, and high and low bank ESG categories. Variable definitions can be found
in appendix 16. 17
accounting for relevant control variables, it appears that borrowers with high sustainability
performance do not receive di↵erent spreads from low vs. high sustainability banks. However,
there seems to be a significant di↵erence for borrowers with low sustainability performance.
Table 17 provides the pairwise correlations between the variables. It shows that envi-
ronmental, social, governance measures are positively correlated for banks and well as for
borrowers. By construction, they are correlated with the aggregate ESG measure. There
does not appear to be any concern of multicollinearity between the variables based on this
table.
4. Methodology and empirical results
The relationship between borrower sustainability performance and bank loan spreads is
analyzed in a multivariate setting. First, the relationship between borrower sustainability
performance and bank loan spreads is examined and reveals that borrowers with strong sus-
tainability performance pay lower loan spreads on average. Then the sample is split in to
two categories, depending on whether the lending bank has strong or weak sustainability
performance. The previous analysis is conducted for these subgroups revealing that, in line
with the hypotheses, the relationship between borrower sustainability performance and loan
spreads only holds for the subgroup that borrowers from banks with strong sustainability per-
formance. The results hold for di↵erent splits, and also for the individual ESG dimensions:
Environmental, social, and governance performance. Next, this result is confirmed using in-
teraction e↵ects, as well as bank and borrower fixed e↵ects to control for unobserved bank
and borrower e↵ects that do not change over time. Propensity score matching is employed
and the average treatment e↵ect on the treated is determined. Furthermore, the multivariate
model is run on the matched sample. Next, within-bank and within-firm analyses are con-
ducted to understand di↵erences in spreads within each group, the di↵erences are also shown
for within-bank-year and within-borrower-year. Selection between banks and borrowers is
addressed by controlling for borrower access to bank loans as measured by the number of
di↵erent banks the borrower borrowers from within the sample in absolute and relative terms.
In order to address potential measurement error in sustainability information, all analyses
are repeated using KLD ESG data rather than Asset4. The format of this data is also di↵er-
ent: Instead of an ESG score, I use principal component analysis to determine the key ESG
strength and weakness factors and find similar results. Finally, time dynamics are explored
to determine whether the documented relationship is stronger in the more recent years with
the increase in monitoring and scrutiny of banks, as well as availability of information.
In order to capture the ESG performance e↵ect, it is necessary to control for a wide range
of borrower and loan characteristics. A multivariate panel model is employed, controlling
for relevant e↵ects and clustering standard errors by the bank-borrower relationship. The
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Hausman test indicates that the errors are correlated with the regressors and hence I should
use a fixed e↵ects model. In terms of borrower characteristics, firm size is controlled for and
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Larger firms may on average receive better
loan conditions, as they tend to have a longer financial history record and stronger reputation
which results in more stable cash flows (Strahan, 1999). Firm performance is controlled for,
measured in ROA, to account for the fact that - all else equal - more profitable firms tend to
be more creditworthy. Leverage is an important determinant of creditworthiness, as the more
levered a firm is, the more diluted the claim on assets. In the case of financial distress, tangible
fixed assets can be liquidated to help settle outstanding claims and hence the tangibility of
assets is expected to decrease loan spreads. This is most likely to be found in the tails of the
distribution, when borrowers are in financial distress situations. The analysis accounts for
this by including tangibility, measured as tangible assets to total assets. The loan spread is
determined depending on other loan contract terms. For example, a longer loan maturity may
increase the risk exposure of the bank. However, the relationship to spread can be the other
way around if it is capturing the fact that more creditworthy firms receive longer maturity
loans. Loan maturity is included, measured as the natural logarithm in months. Another
important loan term included is the loan size. On the one hand, larger loans may reduce the
syndicates diversification benefits and hence be seen as more risky. On the other hand, a
larger loan size may be indicative of a higher creditworthiness of the borrower, as the bank
ultimately decides on the loan amount. An indicator variable that captures whether there
are any kinds of general or financial covenants attached to the loan is included. Covenants
can be used as a tool to reduce agency conflicts within the lending relationship. An indicator
variable for performance pricing is included. Performance pricing can help align interests and
reduce agency problems with managers. However, it may be seen negatively by debt holders
if it encourages excessive risk taking to achieve certain performance benchmarks. Collateral
is commonly used in loan contracting to secure a loan. On the one hand, more collateral
may indicate lower creditworthiness of the borrower. In contrast, a bank that decides that no
collateral is needed may signal that it expects the borrower to repay the loan without issues.
All else equal however, more collateral increases the probability that the loan will be repaid,
even in financial distress and hence could reduce loan spreads. An indicator variable secured
is used to capture this. As these are syndicated loans, the number of borrowers is considered
to take into account any risk-diversification e↵ects that may influence the loan pricing. Also
included are a range of fixed e↵ects to capture the senior debt rating of the borrower, the
purpose of the loan, and type of loan. To take into account macroeconomic factors, fixed
e↵ects are included for the industry and year. Later, bank and firm fixed e↵ects are added to
account for any unobservable di↵erences between banks or borrowers that do not vary over
time.
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4.1. Borrower ESG and loan spreads
The analysis begins by examining the relationship between borrower ESG performance
and loan spreads. The empirical model takes on the following form:
Spread = f(Borrower sustainability performance, firm characteristics, loan characteristics,
macroeconomic controls)
The results are provided in Table 3. In line with the existing literature, they show that
borrowers with better sustainability performance pay less on their bank loans.
Column (1) reveals that a one standard deviation improvement in ESG performance re-
sults in a decrease in loan spreads of approximately 10% of a standard deviation or 11 bps.
The individual ESG dimensions are disaggregated in columns (2) to (4). The results indi-
cate that better ESG performance in each of the individual dimensions is related to lower
loan spreads. While environmental and social performance have similar economic e↵ect sizes,
borrower’s governance score reveals a significantly larger magnitude. This is in line with our
expectation that banks are able to value corporate governance of their borrowers better. A
recent report from Allianz Global Investors summarizes the current research on ESG in the
bond context. They find that ”corporate governance is perceived to be the strongest credit
risk contributor along the ESG dimensions” considered by rating agencies (Ho¨rter, 2016). In
line with this, in a credit policy report of Fitch Ratings they state that ”poor governance
practices, including country-specific and issuer-specific corporate governance matters, can
result in lower ratings than typical quantitative and qualitative credit factors may other-
wise imply” (Gits et al., 2015). Interpreting the control variables, our results indicate that
increased leverage increases loan spreads, supporting the recognized notion that leverage in-
creases credit risk. I also find a significant relationship between the secured indicator variable
and loan spreads. The estimate shows that loans that are secured are charged higher spreads.
This implies that secured loans are on average more risky, as the risk reduction from securing
the loan does not outweigh the higher initial risk of these loans. I do not find a significant
coe cient on loan size and hence cannot conclusively claim whether in our sample the e↵ect
of increased risk due to larger loan size or the signaling of lower risk outweighs.
Altogether, Table 3 is in accordance with the existing literature that finds that better ESG
performance improves access to capital (Goss and Roberts, 2011; Chava, 2014; Kim et al.,
2014; Kleimeier and Viehs, 2016; Cheng et al., 2014). In contrast to the existing empirical
research however, this study neither takes on a purely high-level approach e.g. looking at
aggregate concerns or strengths (Goss and Roberts, 2011), nor does it focus only on a specific
factor such as environmental concerns (Chava, 2014; Kleimeier and Viehs, 2016) or ethics
(Kim et al., 2014).
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Table 3: Borrower sustainability performance and loan spreads
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower ESG -53.74 ***
(3.00)
Borrower ENV -28.16 **
(2.28)
Borrower SOC -33.37 ***
(2.63)
Borrower GOV -41.82 ***
(2.66)
Borrower characteristics
Firm size -0.96 -2.04 -1.45 -3.59
(0.24) (0.52) (0.35) (0.92)
EBIT 11.87 9.86 11.66 11.81
(0.43) (0.36) (0.43) (0.43)
MTB -0.19 ** -0.19 ** -0.19 ** -0.19 **
(2.01) (2.02) (2.06) (2.02)
Leverage 0.76 *** 0.79 *** 0.74 *** 0.78 ***
(3.34) (3.45) (3.25) (3.48)
Pricevol 3.92 *** 3.86 *** 3.87 *** 3.95 ***
(7.16) (7.03) (7.09) (7.05)
Rating 1.90 2.21 * 1.99 1.87
(1.51) (1.74) (1.58) (1.48)
Tangibility -17.36 ** -17.98 *** -18.07 *** -18.7 ***
(2.58) (2.70) (2.66) (2.73)
Loan characteristics
Secured 42.71 *** 43.52 *** 43.73 *** 42.57 ***
(5.02) (5.11) -5.2 -4.93
Numlenders -8.77 *** -9.37 *** -8.9 *** -8.5 **
(2.62) (2.80) (-2.64) (-2.54)
Maturity 0.53 ** 0.56 ** 0.54 ** 0.54 **
(2.21) (2.32) (2.27) (2.23)
Loansize -7.04 -7.07 -7.31 -7.38
(1.45) (1.45) (1.52) (1.51)
Perfpricing -12.18 * -11.86 * -12.39 * -13.17 *
(1.76) (1.71) (1.79) (1.87)
Covenants 1.57 1.68 1.87 2.99
(0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.33)
Fixed e↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 120.62 123.46 118.14 172.23 **
(1.52) (1.55) (1.52) (2.21)
adj. R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. Column (1) reveals the relationship between the aggregate
borrower ESG measure and loan conditions. Columns (2) to (4) look at the individual ESG factors of the
borrower. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on the bank-
borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
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4.2. Sample split into high and low ESG banks
Our hypothesis postulates that borrower sustainability performance is reflected in bank
loan spreads more strongly, when the corresponding bank has high sustainability perfor-
mance. To test this hypothesis, ESG scores from Asset4 are matched into the database to
the appropriate lending banks. This enables us to consider both bank as well as borrower
sustainability in our analysis. The multivariate regression from Table 3 is conducted for two
subsamples of banks: Banks with high sustainability performance and banks with low sus-
tainability ESG performance. The sample is split at the median sustainability performance
of banks such that there are two equally sized samples.
Spread = f(Borrower sustainability performance, firm characteristics, loan characteristics,
macroeconomic controls) if banks has high ESG performance vs. low ESG performance
The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) reveal the split results for
the aggregate ESG measure. It shows that the negative relationship between borrower sus-
tainability performance and loan spreads only holds for banks with high sustainability per-
formance. In columns (3) to (8) the analysis for the individual categories of environmental,
social, and governance performance is conducted. The finding that borrower sustainability
performance only matters for banks that are in the top half of sustainability performance
holds for the individual categories as well. Similar to Table 3, the results reveal the coef-
ficient of borrower governance to be the largest negative coe cient of the ESG measures,
indicating that banks consider governance to be the most highly relevant. The coe cients
for the low sustainability performance banks are not only statistically insignificant on the
regular confidence levels, but they are also much lower in their magnitude compared to their
high-sustainability counterparts. The control variables remain fairly stable compared to the
previous specification, indicating that they are not driving the results.
In untabulated tests I further split the sample into thirds and quartiles of high and low
bank sustainability performance. The results hold and even are stronger in the smaller
subsample analyses. In seemingly unrelated regression models based on these sample-split
regressions and comparing the coe cients of borrower sustainability between the regression
subsamples, the coe cients are also statistically significantly di↵erent from each other across
samples. Furthermore, in untabulated tests CDS spreads are controlled for in addition to
already controlling for credit rating, to more closely determine whether sustainability perfor-
mance is related to credit worthiness. The sample split results hold also controlling for CDS
spreads. Given the multitude of controls for credit risk, this is indicative that the mechanism
may be one other than credit risk.
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Table 4: Split by bank sustainability performance
Bank ESG Bank ENV Bank SOC Bank GOV
Low High Low High Low High Low High
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Borrower ESG -22.39 -91.54***
(1.07) (3.38)
Borrower ENV -23.49 -38.72*
(1.59) (1.93)
Borrower SOC -0.53 -58.09***
(0.03) (3.31)
Borrower GOV -32.08 -60.01***
(1.27) (3.03)
Borrower characteristics
Firm size -10.17** 1.09 -5.28 -7.27 -18.2*** 8.60* -11.45** -0.82
(2.00) (0.22) (1.12) (1.33) (3.41) (1.77) (1.99) (0.16)
EBIT -45.89* 32.33 -62.73*** 28.96 -25.3 34.39 58.21** -34.52
(1.79) (1.32) (2.62) (1.13) (0.54) (1.24) (2.21) (0.95)
MTB -1.22** -0.09 -0.19*** -1.00** -1.82*** -0.08 -2.35* -0.03
(2.58) (1.29) (3.35) (2.55) (2.75) (1.15) (1.74) (0.55)
Leverage 0.44 0.63* 0.87*** 0.66* 0.47 0.88*** 0.58* 1.05***
(1.54) (1.93) (3.38) (1.89) (1.29) (3.29) (1.92) (3.52)
Pricevol 3.42*** 4.12*** 3.88*** 3.49*** 3.61*** 4.04*** 4.17*** 3.96***
(5.38) (5.91) (5.22) (4.95) (5.37) (5.86) (5.85) (5.66)
Rating 2.24 1.17 2.14 0.26 0.99 1.57 -0.38 1.45
(1.31) (0.67) (1.26) (0.15) (0.52) (0.91) (0.22) (0.82)
Tangibility -39.06*** -12.97 -21.36*** -17.56* -46.65*** 2.23 -34.61*** -2.67
(3.80) (1.49) (3.06) (1.83) (4.79) (0.28) (3.51) (0.34)
Loan characteristics
Secured 39.65*** 42.33*** 47.07*** 43.91*** 40.05*** 42.19*** 45.36*** 37.04***
(3.60) (3.31) (4.00) (3.28) (3.50) (3.49) (3.90) (2.65)
Numlenders -10.64** -6.31 -10.31** -8.46 -7.69 -9.83** -10.51* -6.29
(2.05) (1.28) (2.37) (1.64) (1.43) (2.10) (1.89) (1.47)
Maturity 0.15 0.88** 0.48* 0.64* -0.02 1.16*** 0.37 0.50
(0.55) (2.47) (1.70) (1.80) (0.08) (3.55) (1.20) (1.55)
Loansize 3.57 -9.50 1.69 -10.39* 3.24 -16.32** -2.56 -10.78*
(0.80) (1.46) (0.32) (1.70) (0.71) (2.36) (0.55) (1.73)
Perfpricing -13.06 -20.12** -3.01 -21.34** -19.75* -13.52 -2.00 -20.66*
(1.20) (2.09) (0.27) (2.31) (1.81) (1.56) (0.22) (1.74)
Covenants 10.21 -1.96 3.15 -1.73 18.67 -6.27 1.83 5.64
(0.87) (0.15) (0.28) (0.13) (1.59) (0.45) (0.17) (0.38)
Fixed e↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 137.11 142.01 -7.61 300.31*** 209.65** 160.33 162.8* 248.81**
(1.50) (1.31) (0.09) (2.62) (2.00) (1.49) (1.94) (2.39)
adj. R2 0.71 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.72 0.63
N 613 613 613 613 613 613 613 613
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. Columns (1) and (2) reveal the relationship between
borrower ESG and loan conditions after splitting observations by the median Bank ESG performance.
Columns (3) and (4) consider environmental performance, (5) and (6) social performance, (7) and (8)
governance. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on the bank-
borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.23
4.3. Interaction e↵ects
In the next step, an interaction e↵ect is constructed between bank and borrower sustain-
ability performance to capture the relationship more precisely. The results are provided in
Table 5. When both bank and borrower sustainability performance are higher, loans spreads
are lower. In column (1) the result is shown for the aggregate ESG measure. In columns (2)
to (4) the individual sustainability measures are investigated separately. The table reveals
that all three factors - environmental, social, and governance performance - interacted with
the respective bank dimension load negatively and significantly. This supports our previ-
ous findings that borrower sustainability performance reduces loan spreads especially when
bank sustainability performance is high. The positive level e↵ect of borrower sustainability
performance reveals that this is otherwise not the case.
As an additional robustness exercise, bank and firm fixed e↵ects are included to control
for any unobservable di↵erences between banks and between firms that do not change over
time and are not absorbed by our existing control variables. The results are shown in Table 6.
There is no evidence that the results are additionally driven by fixed e↵ects as our coe cients
are similar to the previous model including firm and loan controls. The high adjusted R-
squared of almost 70% indicates that our models have a strong predictive power in explaining
the variation in syndicated loan spreads.
For additional robustness all previous analyses are conducted on a sample that excludes
financial and utility companies in untabulated tests, although industry fixed e↵ects are con-
trolled for in the models. The literature often excludes firms in these categories, as they
are considered to be quite di↵erent to other industries and may have di↵erent cash flow risk
exposures. For this study, the results are robust to the exclusion of such firms.
4.4. Within firm and within bank spread changes
To ensure that our multivariate results using panel data are not driven by cross-sectional
variation but that these results can also be recorded within firms and banks, di↵erences in
spreads for borrowing firms that borrow from di↵erent banks and analyze spreads of banks
that lend to di↵erent borrowers are analyzed. The results are shown in Table 7. In Panel A,
the focus is on borrowing firms that borrow from banks with di↵erent levels of sustainability
performance. According to our hypothesis, borrower sustainability performance should vary
when borrowing from a bank with high sustainability performance, as these banks price the
information. Therefore the sample splits the borrowers into borrowers with low sustainability
performance and borrowers with high sustainability performance, where the cut-o↵ point is
determined at the 25% level. The results reveal that low ESG borrowers receive better loan
spreads from low sustainability banks, than from high sustainability banks. The di↵erence is
on average 64 bps for the aggregate ESG measure. These di↵erences can also be found in the
subcategories, especially for environmental performance but also for social performance. For
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Table 5: Interaction e↵ects
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower score 125.92 ** 77.40 * 25.24 125.62 **
(2.00) (1.84) (0.84) (2.24)
Bank score 116.13 ** 22.27 * 23.36 163.04 ***
(2.40) (1.88) (1.00) (2.93)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ESG -234.13 ***
(2.77)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ENV -136.90 **
(2.50)
Bank ⇥ Borrower SOC -81.15 *
(1.87)
Bank ⇥ Borrower GOV -225.01 ***
(2.98)
Borrower characteristics
Firm size -1.17 -1.89 -1.22 -3.78
(0.30) (0.48) (0.30) (1.00)
EBIT 13.00 9.98 12.39 12.50
(0.48) (0.36) (0.45) (0.46)
MTB -0.19 ** -0.18 ** -0.19 ** -0.19 **
(1.99) (2.02) (2.02) (1.99)
Leverage 0.75 *** 0.77 *** 0.75 *** 0.77 ***
(3.30) (3.38) (3.31) (3.41)
Pricevol 3.86 *** 3.86 *** 3.83 *** 3.96 ***
(7.20) (7.14) (7.21) (7.10)
Rating 1.81 2.02 1.80 1.52
(1.44) (1.61) (1.43) (1.20)
Tangibility -17.41 *** -18.25 *** -17.88 *** -18.56 ***
(2.62) (2.80) (2.65) (2.71)
Loan characteristics
Secured 43.5 *** 44.12 *** 44.34 *** 42.96 ***
(5.07) (5.15) (5.22) (4.96)
Numlenders -8.69 ** -9.47 *** -9.06 *** -8.37 **
(2.57) (2.84) (2.69) (2.49)
Maturity 0.53 ** 0.57 ** 0.54 ** 0.56 **
(2.26) (2.38) (2.32) (2.33)
Loansize -6.90 -7.02 -7.47 -7.25
(1.45) (1.44) (1.57) (1.48)
Perfpricing -13.02 * -12.09 * -13.28 * -13.90 *
(1.88) (1.74) (1.92) (1.96)
Covenants 2.09 1.14 2.81 4.55
(0.23) (0.13) (0.32) (0.49)
Fixed e↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 33.82 103.5 93.16 53.94
(0.43) (1.30) (1.22) (0.62)
adj. R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. Column (1) reveals the relationship between borrower
ESG and loan conditions including an interaction e↵ect by Bank ESG performance. Columns (2) to (4)
consider environmental performance, social, and governance performance. Borrower score and bank score
are the respective baseline variables of the interactions. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16.
Standard errors are clustered on the bank-borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are
in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 6: Bank and firm fixed e↵ects
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower score 124.74 ** 72.06 * 26.60 124.22 **
(2.03) (1.74) (0.89) (2.22)
Bank score 123.69 ** 24.61 ** 30.31 168.61 ***
(2.48) (2.02) (1.15) (3.05)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ESG -231.1 ***
(2.82)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ENV -129.39 **
(2.42)
Bank ⇥ Borrower SOC -82.14 *
(1.91)
Bank ⇥ Borrower GOV -220.66 ***
(2.95)
Borrower characteristics
Firm size -1.26 -1.95 -1.43 -3.84
(0.32) (0.49) (0.35) (1.00)
EBIT 13.81 10.76 13.04 13.25
(0.51) (0.39) (0.48) (0.49)
MTB -0.19 ** -0.19 ** -0.2 ** -0.19 **
(2.02) (2.04) (2.10) (2.02)
Leverage 0.77 *** 0.79 *** 0.77 *** 0.79 ***
(3.40) (3.47) (3.37) (3.52)
Pricevol 3.93 *** 3.94 *** 3.93 *** 4.02 ***
(7.34) (7.27) (7.34) (7.23)
Rating 1.66 1.86 1.76 1.39
(1.33) (1.50) (1.40) (1.11)
Tangibility -16.9 ** -17.75 *** -17.63 *** -18.06 ***
(2.57) (2.74) (2.64) (2.66)
Loan characteristics
Secured 43.52 *** 43.95 *** 43.23 *** 43.01 ***
(5.00) (5.06) (5.09) (4.90)
Numlenders -9.02 *** -9.79 *** -9.19 *** -8.71 ***
(2.69) (2.95) (2.70) (2.61)
Maturity 0.54 ** 0.58 ** 0.55 ** 0.57 **
(2.33) (2.44) (2.37) (2.39)
Loansize -6.69 -6.76 -7.06 -7.03
(1.38) (1.37) (1.46) (1.41)
Perfpricing -12.64 * -11.71 * -12.78 * -13.49 *
(1.80) (1.67) (1.82) (1.89)
Covenants 2.00 1.08 2.44 4.41
(0.22) (0.12) (0.27) (0.48)
Fixed e↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 20.13 95.37 88.6 40.81
(0.25) (1.20) (1.15) (0.48)
adj. R2 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.68
N 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. Column (1) reveals the relationship between borrower
ESG and loan conditions including an interaction e↵ect by Bank ESG performance. Columns (2) to (4)
consider environmental performance, social, and governance performance. Borrower score and bank score
are the respective baseline variables of the interactions. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16.
Standard errors are clustered on the bank-borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are
in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
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governance, there is slight evidence that well governed borrowers receive better loan spreads
from well governed banks. Altogether, the within-firm analysis however indicates that the
di↵erence is largely driven by weak sustainability borrowers, rather than strong performers
in sustainability. This supports the notion of a premium for bad behavior, rather than a
discount for good behavior.
Panel B considers within-bank di↵erences in loan spreads for banks that lend to borrowers
that have di↵erent levels of sustainability performance. The split is in accordance with Panel
A. For the aggregate ESG measure, banks with high ESG performance provide di↵erent loan
spreads to borrowers depending on their sustainability performance. The average di↵erence
is 56 bps, which is similar to the di↵erences documented in Panel A that borrowers experience
depending on the di↵erent banks that they receive credit from. Observing the loan spread
di↵erences for the subcategories of ESG performance, for environmental sustainability, both
banks with high and low distinguish between their borrowers sustainability performance.
However, in terms of magnitude, the banks with high environmental performance provide
80 bps di↵erence in spreads while low environmental banks provide only 21 bps di↵erence
and only at the 10% significance level. For social and governance performance of banks,
only banks with high sustainability performance take these factors into account when pricing
loans.
The results in this table provide evidence that sustainability performance is only priced
by banks with high performance. More specifically, this table shows us that the variation
in spreads is driven by a downside premium, rather than an upside discount for borrowers
that are considered more sustainable. In an open market, banks are in competition to retain
customers and lending relationships. Increasing loan spreads may result in a loss of business
and should therefore be considered with caution. Why do borrowers with low sustainability
performance take loans from banks with high sustainability performance? As this is the
first study to examine and document this e↵ect, it is possible that the respective borrowers
are not aware of the counterfactual situation, had they turned to a less sustainable bank.
Another explanation is that banks with strong ESG performance tend to be larger and hence
easier accessible. If the cost of reaching out to a smaller, less accessible bank is higher than
the additional spread charge, this is an economically sound reason to borrower from a bank
with strong sustainability performance as a low-sustainability borrower. Similarly, if lending
relationships have persisted and switching costs are high, borrowers may prefer to remain with
the bank. In the case of the later two arguments, the important role of banks in fostering
sustainability is apparent, as borrowers that do not want to or cannot switch will benefit
from strengthening their sustainability performance.
Table 8 shows how the relationship evolves over di↵erent deciles of borrower sustain-
ability performance. The table provides the mean spread for loans from high vs. low ESG
banks split at the median. The last column shows the di↵erence in spreads. Borrower ESG
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Table 7: Within firm and bank spread changes
Panel A: Firm perspective
Within firm Within firm-year
Borrower Bank N Mean Stdev Di↵. t-stat N Mean Stdev Di↵. t-stat
Low ESG: Low ESG 88 102.35 86.73 -63.62 *** 3.28 11 98.23 68.72 -88.21 1.26
High ESG 56 165.96 146.34 15 186.43 224.31
High ESG: Low ESG 65 75.92 82.32 7.16 0.66 14 84.11 65.06 -5.32 0.19
High ESG 91 68.76 53.92 13 89.42 77.18
Low ENV: Low ENV 89 102.86 94.05 -174.29 *** 5.38 14 95.11 75.08 -98.32 1.51
High ENV 19 277.15 231.47 14 193.43 232.25
High ENV: Low ENV 67 77.06 83.32 -7.10 0.46 14 94.82 72.57 17.55 0.69
High ENV 37 84.16 56.08 11 77.27 48.66
Low SOC: Low SOC 105 126.01 91.73 -44.65 ** 2.53 10 94.30 72.58 -83.76 -1.17
High SOC 76 170.66 145.33 16 178.06 217.63
High SOC: Low SOC 84 99.98 102.37 10.02 0.69 14 99.46 85.53 20.04 0.71
High SOC 102 89.96 95.94 13 79.42 56.96
Low GOV: Low GOV 142 155.72 137.09 20.29 1.15 11 100.27 67.97 -83.33 1.19
High GOV 94 135.43 124.53 15 183.60 224.17
High GOV: Low GOV 112 127.29 109.79 23.95 * 1.55 14 70.71 42.57 -34.67 1.26
High GOV 110 103.34 101.93 13 105.38 93.43
Panel B: Bank perspective
Within bank Within bank-year
Bank Borrower N Mean Stdev Di↵. t-stat N Mean Stdev Di↵. t-stat
Low ESG: Low ESG 331 97.61 80.01 15.65 1.47 187 92.56 76.67 8.74 1.01
High ESG 72 81.97 89.62 134 83.82 76.36
High ESG: Low ESG 274 148.72 114.94 56.01 *** 4.98 454 156.91 122.96 139.13 *** 4.99
High ESG 129 92.70 81.14 330 114.68 107.88
Low ENV: Low ENV 121 111.31 88.40 21.72 * 1.66 232 101.59 90.59 9.51 0.94
High ENV 81 89.59 94.15 116 92.08 85.61
High ENV: Low ENV 102 200.52 132.56 80.85 *** 5.15 472 146.61 123.98 25.74 *** 2.93
High ENV 125 119.67 103.84 282 120.87 103.03
Low SOC: Low SOC 92 129.73 94.37 18.96 1.21 236 142.84 115.78 22.34 * 1.95
High SOC 87 110.77 114.77 168 120.49 109.94
High SOC: Low SOC 105 156.47 127.25 67.01 *** 4.35 399 136.54 113.71 39.89 *** 4.91
High SOC 106 89.46 94.20 302 96.65 96.08
Low GOV: Low GOV 305 135.44 124.94 21.11 1.49 238 134.59 117.47 13.32 1.26
High GOV 98 114.33 111.81 293 121.27 123.80
High GOV: Low GOV 295 120.51 108.07 20.66 * 1.73 241 137.43 96.81 26.51 *** 3.17
High GOV 108 99.85 99.89 333 110.92 100.36
Notes: The table provides the mean di↵erence of spreads for within firm changes of bank in Panel A, and
within bank changes of firms in Panel B. More specifically, Panel A provides the average spread for firms
that borrow from banks with di↵erent ESG scores and uses a mean di↵erence t-test to compare the spreads
in both groups. Similarly, Panel B encompasses banks that have borrowers with di↵erent ESG scores and
compares the average spreads that these borrowers receive in each group. The ”within firm” columns split
the sample at the 25th and 75th percentile, while the ”within firm-year” columns split the sample at the
median to retain observations. Untabulated tests reveal that splitting the ”within firm-year” samples at the
25th and 75th percentiles produces stronger di↵erence estimate for the low ESG borrowers and high ESG
banks as predicted although not significant due to the low sample size. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
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Table 8: Average spread over sustainability deciles
Low bank ESG High bank ESG Di↵erence
(I) (II) (I) - (II)
Borrower ESG decile 1 159.65 175.18 15.53
Borrower ESG decile 2 154.38 188.88 34.50
Borrower ESG decile 3 112.69 155.17 42.48
Borrower ESG decile 4 102.91 157.47 54.56
Borrower ESG decile 5 120.21 132.47 12.26
Borrower ESG decile 6 100.62 170.81 70.19
Borrower ESG decile 7 93.32 125.28 31.96
Borrower ESG decile 8 111.95 120.61 8.66
Borrower ESG decile 9 105.05 114.63 9.58
Borrower ESG decile 10 91.98 94.57 2.59
Notes: The table provides the mean spread for banks with high vs. low sustainability performance for
ten deciles of borrower sustainability performance, showing how di↵erences in spread change depending on
borrower sustainability levels.
decile 1 encompasses the loans with the lowest sustainability performance of borrowers, while
Borrower ESG decile 10 includes borrowers with the top 10% of sustainability performance.
Eyeballing the table reveals that borrowers in the most sustainable decile receive the lowest
loan spreads. However, the di↵erence in loan spreads is more pronounced for the sample of
high ESG banks. Our findings seem to be driven by the earlier deciles of borrowers, indicat-
ing that particularly when borrowers are considered less sustainable, the di↵erence in spreads
depending on the type of bank is large.
Finally, the multivariate regression is repeated on the sample of banks and borrowers that
lend to both high and low ESG borrowers and borrow from banks with high and low ESG
performance, respectively. The results are shown in table 9. Column (1) incorporates the
sample of borrowers with low ESG performance that borrow from banks with di↵erent levels
of ESG performance. A spread di↵erence of 67.57 bps is documented. Column (2) shows
the results for the sample of borrowers with high ESG performance which also borrow from
banks with di↵erent levels of ESG performance. In accordance with the expectations, there
are no di↵erences in loan spreads depending on bank ESG performance. In columns (3) and
(4) the results are shown for the bank samples, where column (3) comprises banks with low
ESG performance and column (4) banks with high ESG performance. Within the sample of
banks that lend to di↵erent types of borrowers, the result only holds for banks with high ESG
performance and borrowers with low ESG performance. This setting allows us to ensure a
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Table 9: Multivariate regressions on within change sample
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank ESG (dummy) 67.57*** -22.07
(2.89) (-1.51)
Borrower ESG (dummy) 3.14 -32.97***
(0.25) (-2.67)
Firm characteristics
Firm size -5.37 15.78 -13.37** 4.85
(-0.40) (1.49) (-2.46) (0.76)
EBIT -60.49 -122.77 -50.83* -11.83
(-0.67) (-1.58) (-1.79) (-0.36)
MTB -1.43 0.14 -1.03*** -0.16
(-1.21) (0.08) (-3.42) (-0.23)
Leverage 0.92 0.30 -0.01 0.71*
(1.01) (0.64) (-0.04) (1.78)
Pricevol 6.12*** 2.02 2.86*** 3.04***
(2.93) (1.48) (3.86) (3.53)
Rating 6.22 6.26** 2.10 5.35**
(1.29) (2.45) (1.12) (2.21)
Tangibility -8.70 -11.09 -31.66*** 1.32
(-0.41) (-0.69) (-3.44) (0.12)
Loan characteristics
Secured 90.33*** 61.30 47.89*** 36.86*
(3.67) (1.42) (3.98) (1.85)
Numlenders -23.79 12.95** -8.65 -7.45
(-1.58) (2.23) (-1.58) (-1.14)
Maturity 1.28* 0.09 -0.39 1.22***
(1.71) (0.27) (-1.33) (3.18)
Loan size -17.58 -7.45 7.57 -14.64**
(-1.36) (-1.28) (1.59) (-2.02)
Perfpricing 27.16 3.24 -11.03 -17.45
(0.91) (0.19) (-0.72) (-1.24)
Covenants -26.43 8.11 -1.01 -11.04
(-0.81) (0.42) (-0.06) (-0.59)
Fixed e↵ects
Loan purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 165.17 -260.37 168.99* 197.61
(0.68) (-1.43) (1.67) (1.54)
N 144 156 403 403
Adj. R2 0.66 0.65 0.59 0.54
Notes: The table provides the results for the multivariate regression based on within-firm and within-bank
di↵erences in bank ESG and borrower ESG, respectively. Column (1) comprises borrowers with low ESG
performance that borrower from both high and low ESG banks. Column (2) comprises high ESG borrowers
that borrower from both high and low ESG banks. Column (3) shows the results for the sample of low ESG
banks that lend to both high and low ESG borrowers. Finally, column (4) shows the results for the sample
of high ESG banks that lend to both high and low ESG borrowers.
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robust documentation of the findings by reducing any e↵ects of correlated omitted variables.
4.5. Selection
A natural concern is whether the results are driven by matching between banks and
borrowers. First, the characteristics between borrowers that borrow from banks with strong
ESG performance vs. those with weak ESG performance may di↵er. We address this in
the next subsection. Second, borrowers may switch to banks that are more favorable to
them. This gives rise to the question whether the results are driven by borrowers that are
constrained in their banking relationships, as unconstrained borrowers could switch to banks
that provide cheaper loans. This is addressed in the second subsection.
4.5.1. Propensity Score Matching
If strong ESG borrowers are generally more creditworthy and strong ESG banks lend to
them more than to other borrowers, then we may be capturing this e↵ect. To visualize this
concern, figure 2 shows the distribution of borrower ESG scores for banks in the upper and
lower half of ESG bank performance. The distribution for banks with high ESG performance
is more platykurtic compared to that of the banks with lower ESG performance, however
their mean and median values appear to be similar. I address the matching concern by first
investigating di↵erences in variables for the sample of borrowers that borrower from high
vs. low ESG banks.3 I then use propensity score matching to, in the first step, estimate
the probability that a borrower selects into a high or low ESG bank or borrower, and in
the second step, use the estimated propensity to compute the average treatment e↵ect on
the syndicated loan spread for the matrix of four possible bank-borrower combinations. In
accordance with our findings indicating that the di↵erence is driven by a penalty for borrowers
with low sustainability performance, the subsets of low ESG borrowers and high ESG banks
are of particular interest to us.
The results of the first stage probit are shown in Table 10. Borrower-specific control
variables from the multivariate regression models are used to estimate the probability that
the corresponding bank is of high or low sustainability. The probit model regresses the high-
ESG-bank instrument on size, EBIT, MTB, Leverage, Pricevol, Rating, and Tangibility. For
the sample A of low ESG borrowers, larger and more price-volatile borrowers borrower from
high ESG banks. For the sample B of high ESG borrowers they tend to be more levered
when the bank has high ESG performance. Samples C and D provide the probit models for
the samples of high and low ESG banks, respectively.
3A simple mean di↵erence t-test between borrowers that borrow from high vs. low ESG banks reveals
di↵erences in stock price volatility, but most other covariates do not di↵er between the two groups. The
results of the mean di↵erence between between high and low ESG banks for the firm characteristics can be
found in appendix Table 18.
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Figure 2: Borrower sustainability performance for banks with high and low ESG
In the second step, the di↵erence in loan spread is computed for observations of the
treated compared to the untreated group that have similar propensity scores. Table 11 shows
the average treatment e↵ect of the treated group for each sample. The results are in line
with our previous findings, indicating that borrowers with low sustainability scores receive
higher loan spreads when borrowing from a bank that has high sustainability performance.
In terms of magnitude, the average treatment e↵ect for borrowers with low ESG performance
borrowing from high ESG banks is 81 to 90 bps in di↵erence, as shown in Table 11 in samples
A and C. Using the same propensity score matching procedure, the average treatment e↵ect
for borrowers with high sustainability scores is not significant, as seen for sample B, or banks
with low sustainability performance, as seen for sample D.
Next, the multivariate regression from the previous section on the propensity score matched
sample is run. The results are provided in Table 12. Similar results for the propensity score
matched samples are documented as in the multivariate models with sample splits and inter-
action e↵ects. For the sample of low ESG borrowers, sample A, the table reveals that these
borrowers receive rates that are 63.15 bps higher, while this is not the case for high ESG
borrowers, shown in sample B. Similarly, for the sample of high ESG banks, in sample C,
borrowers with high ESG performance pay lower spreads of 58.85 bps, after controlling for
other possible confounding variables. This does not hold for sample D which comprises low
ESG banks.
4.5.2. Constrained borrowers
In the case that borrowers are constrained in their borrowing and highly dependent on
a bank, the bank may be able to take advantage of this in the loan pricing. This could
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Table 10: Propensity Score Matching - Probit
Dep. Var. Low-high Low-high Low-high Low-high
ESG bank ESG bank ESG borrower ESG borrower
(A) ( B) ( C) ( D)
Firm size 0.24 * 0.07 0.37 *** 0.72 ***
1.92 0.73 3.40 4.61
EBIT -0.63 1.05 -0.18 -2.89 ***
-1.10 1.20 -0.40 -3.09
MTB -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.09 ***
-1.56 -0.02 1.10 2.86
Leverage 0.01 0.03 ** 0.00 -0.01
0.78 2.32 -0.34 -0.62
Pricevol 0.07 *** 0.00 -0.03 ** 0.01
4.77 0.02 -2.29 0.34
Rating 0.08 0.03 -0.07 -0.04
1.46 0.60 -1.35 -0.76
Tangibility -0.02 0.08 0.39 * 0.90 ***
-0.07 0.33 1.73 3.27
Constant -6.36 *** -1.65 -4.01 ** -10.27 ***
-3.12 -0.94 -2.15 -4.24
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.27
N 144 96 140 122
Sample: A B C D
Low ESG High ESG High ESG Low ESG
borrowers borrowers banks banks
Notes: The table reveals the first stage results of the propensity score matching in which the propensity of
being in a bank with high ESG performance or borrower with high ESG performance is estimated according
to firm characteristics. The dependent variables are calculated as a dummy that equals zero for banks and
borrowers in the lower quartile of ESG performance, and it is one when ESG performance is in the top
quartile. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on the bank-
borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
Table 11: Propensity Score Matching - Average Treatment e↵ect
Sample Treated Control Di↵. S.E. T-statistic Treated Controls N
(A) 186.88 106.03 80.85 19.15 4.22 70 74 144
(B) 91.31 83.15 8.17 18.60 0.44 48 48 96
(C) 97.19 186.88 -89.69 19.46 -4.61 70 70 140
(D) 83.15 95.15 -12.00 17.83 -0.67 48 74 122
Notes: The table provides the average treatment e↵ect on the treated, where the treated is the dependent
variable of the first stage probit and the treatment e↵ect is the spread di↵erence between the treated and
untreated (control) group. Sample A to D follows the definition shown in first stage probit table.
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Table 12: Propensity Score Matching - Multivariate regression on matched samples
Dep.: Spread Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D
Bank ESG (dummy) 63.15 ** 27.36
(2.17) (0.81)
Borrower ESG (dummy) -58.85 ** 19.42
(2.00) (0.66)
Firm characteristics
Firm size -38.12 ** 28.75 7.97 -10.44
(2.00) (1.67) (0.30) (0.60)
EBIT -5.70 -171.37 -58.96 -173.01 **
(0.06) (1.31) (1.38) (2.14)
MTB -4.91 -5.89 1.34 -7.22
(0.86) (1.01) (0.77) (1.61)
Leverage 1.44 4.53 ** 2.68 ** 0.53
(1.11) (2.57) (2.56) (0.41)
Pricevol 5.87 ** 2.62 2.88 4.04 **
(2.46) (1.56) (1.51) (2.13)
Rating -1.52 13.16 ** 5.63 6.87
(0.29) (2.17) (1.15) (1.19)
Tangibility -22.66 -6.99 66.92 -36.26
(0.62) (0.19) (1.64) (1.23)
Loan characteristics
Secured 51.73 53.94 64.44 11.35
(1.58) (1.40) (1.47) (0.31)
Numlenders -45.15 *** -6.78 -6.50 3.64
(2.81) (0.42) (0.41) (0.29)
Maturity 1.67 -0.66 0.84 -0.13
(1.59) (1.03) (0.71) (0.17)
Loan size -8.23 -28.07 * -20.03 19.23
(0.59) (1.88) (1.50) (1.44)
Perfpricing 17.27 66.02 69.40 * -69.82 **
(0.54) (1.41) (1.79) 2.05
Covenants -59.05 -79.53 -111.17 * 62.70 **
(1.50) (1.56) (1.90) (2.30)
Fixed E↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 741.20 -16.85 397.16 -305.35
(2.30) (0.06) (0.82) (1.15)
Notes: The table shows the results of the multivariate regression on spread using the matched samples
determined through propensity score matching. Sample A includes low ESG performance borrowers and
observes the spread di↵erence between high and low ESG banks. Sample B includes high ESG borrowers
and shows the di↵erence between high and low ESG banks. Sample C includes the high ESG performance
banks and shows the spread di↵erence for low and high ESG borrowers. Sample D includes low ESG banks
and shows the spread di↵erence between high and low ESG borrowers. Variable definitions can be found
in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on the bank-borrower relationship level. Absolute values of
the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***,
respectively.
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be driving the result for borrowers with weak sustainability performance. To address this,
I generate a proxy for this by taking the total number of di↵erent banks that a borrower
receives loans from and develop a ratio that scales this number by the total number of loan
observations that the number of banks is based on. The idea is that when a borrower has
more options in terms of di↵erent banks that would o↵er them capital, the borrower may
be able to switch between banks and hence the results of this study could be driven by
borrowers that are constrained to certain banks. Table 13 in Panel A provides the results for
the multivariate regression with interactions e↵ects, controlling for the ratio of di↵erent banks
to total loan observations. The control variables are the same as in the previous analyses.
The results indicate that the findings are not driven by borrower access to banks. In Panel
B, the analysis is run on a subsample of borrowers that are unrestricted and have at least
two di↵erent banks that they obtain bank loans from in the sample. Although the sample
is about a quarter, the results are similar. In untabulated tests I use the absolute number
of di↵erent banks per borrower instead of the relative number and find very similar results.
Selection does not appear to be a concern in this study.
4.6. Measurement Error
A concern about sustainability data is that it often contains qualitative and unaudited
items, while transparency and comparability of items is not yet fully developed. We consider
an alternative widely used data source for sustainability, although our ESG data source,
Asset4, runs extensive quality controls to ensure high quality of the data. Asset4 data
is collected from public sources in one of the largest ESG content collection operations in
the world and undergoes more than 400 built-in error checks. This is followed by about
300 further automated screens that capture inconsistencies. Finally, the data undergoes
independent audits and in-depths management checks.
Nevertheless I re-run all analyses using data from a di↵erent data provider, KLD, which
belongs to one of the most used data providers for sustainability data in the academic world
but also among practitioners. KLD provides company-specific data on strengths and con-
cerns along the dimensions: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations,
environment and human rights. They are compiled using public information such as financial
statement data, media reports, government documents, and also surveys.
Following Goss and Roberts (2011), I run a principal component analysis along the
strengths and along the concerns to extract the respective principal components. A scree
plot shows a significant decline and leveling-o↵ after the first component in both cases. The
explanatory power of the first component in both cases accounts for approximately 30-40%
of the total variation (eigenvalue to number of principal components). I include the first
principal component for the sustainability strengths and the first component for the con-
cerns jointly to test whether the results hold for this alternative measure of sustainability
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Table 13: Borrower access to banks
Panel A: Controlling for relative number of di↵erent banks
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower score 125.84 ** 77.74 * 25.20 125.30 **
(2.00) (1.84) (0.84) (2.23)
Bank score 116.13 ** 22.27 * 23.31 162.53 ***
(2.40) (1.88) (1.02) (2.92)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ESG -234.13 ***
(2.77)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ENV -137.22 **
(2.50)
Bank ⇥ Borrower SOC -81.06 *
(1.90)
Bank ⇥ Borrower GOV -224.62 ***
(2.97)
Ratio di↵erent banks -1.22 -2.88 -0.34 -3.06
(0.12) (0.28) (0.03) (0.30)
Borrower characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Panel B: Sample of unrestricted borrowers
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3) (4)
Borrower score 289.48 ** 94.23 * 106.22 * 126.95
(2.37) (1.21) (1.82) (0.95)
Bank score 318.81 *** 61.64.27 ** 103.94 277.75 *
(3.18) (2.48) (2.07) (1.91)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ESG -514.97 ***
(3.11)
Bank ⇥ Borrower ENV -180.81 *
(1.78)
Bank ⇥ Borrower SOC -247.11 ***
(2.93)
Bank ⇥ Borrower GOV -287.21
(1.54)
Borrower characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
adj. R2 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.72
N 378 378 378 378
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. Column (1) reveals the relationship between borrower
ESG and loan conditions including an interaction e↵ect by Bank ESG performance. Columns (2) to (4)
consider environmental performance, social, and governance performance. Borrower score and bank score
are the respective baseline variables of the interactions. Panel A includes the variable ”Ratio di↵erent banks”
that proxies for how restricted borrowers are to banks. It reflects the total number of di↵erent banks that
a borrower borrows from scaled by the total number of loan observations that this value is derived from.
Panel B provides the results of the multivariate regression for borrowers with at least two di↵erent banks
that they borrow from. Variable definitions can be found in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on
the bank-borrower relationship level. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *, **, ***, respectively.
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performance. Using KLD strengths and weaknesses instead of the Asset4 ESG score does not
change the results.
The results are provided in Table 14. The first column shows the interaction of bank
and borrower sustainability performance considering borrower strengths according to KLD.
In the second column, the concerns are interacted with borrower sustainability performance.
Finally, in column 3, both interactions are included jointly. The results reveal that it is the
concerns rather than the strengths in borrower ESG performance that are driving the results,
in other words the downside variation of ESG scores as discussed in the previous results.
4.7. Time e↵ects
To attain a deeper understanding of the relationship between borrower sustainability and
loan spreads, time dynamics are taken into account. In the last decade, the quality and com-
parability of sustainability information has increased dramatically. This was complemented
with a strong increase in scrutiny, especially of the banking sector after the financial crisis.
The crisis in 2008 resulted not only in immediate economic and social consequences, but also
in a severe disruption of trust in the financial system. From ordinary citizens, who stored
their entire life savings at banks, to governments and regulators, people were devastated by
the suddenly crystallized fragility of the financial system. Banks in particular came under
the intense scrutiny of the media, regulators, and ordinary citizens and were often blamed
for unethical and careless decisions, such as lending and re-securitizing opaque sub prime
mortgages. This resulted in great pressure on banks to improve their practices and hence,
it is expected that sustainability is a more prominent topic for banks in more recent years
and in the wake of the crisis than prior to it. This has come at the same time with an
increase in sustainability reporting internationally. To mention some examples of shifts to-
wards sustainability, Bank of America began regularly publishing CSR reports from 2011
onwards, Barclays updated their sustainability reporting in 2013 from a more simple version
that existed since 1998, and Wells Fargo developed a new CSR strategy in 2009 and started
publishing regular reports from 2011 onwards. I hypothesize that the pricing of borrower
sustainability into loan spreads increases over this time frame, with the increase in public
monitoring and improvement in data availability.
To examine this empirically, a multivariate regression with an interaction term between
year and borrower ESG in the basic regression of borrower ESG on loan spreads is employed.
The results are presented in Table 15. Columns (1) to (4) depict the interaction e↵ects for the
full sample using year interactions with borrower ESG performance. The coe cient estimates
indicate that with progression of time, borrower ESG performance has a stronger relationship
with loan spreads.
For columns (5) to (8), a dummy variable is constructed that equals 0 for the years 2002 to
2008 and it equals 1 for the years 2009 to 2015. This provides a broader measurement of the
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Table 14: KLD sustainability performance interaction
Dep.: Spread (1) (2) (3)
Bank score -20.18 -16.24 -16.68
(1.21) (0.99) (1.01)
KLD ESG strengths 2.21 8.76
(0.17) (0.67)
Bank score ⇥ KLD ESG strengths -10.54 -17.85
(0.57) (1.01)
KLD ESG concerns -12.22 ** -14.26 **
(2.24) (2.49)
Bank score ⇥ KLD ESG concerns 18.62 ** 21.90 ***
(2.24) (2.63)
Borrower characteristics
Firm size 0.59 -4.01 -0.84
(0.17) (1.12) (0.24)
EBIT -10.60 -14.97 -12.72
(0.52) (0.72) (0.61)
MTB -0.85 *** -0.91 *** -0.83 ***
(3.75) (4.11) (4.09)
Leverage 0.78 *** 0.81 *** 0.79 ***
(4.11) (4.16) (4.16)
Pricevol 3.68 *** 3.73 *** 3.67 ***
(6.95) (6.83) (6.88)
Rating 1.10 0.60 0.52
(0.83) (0.46) (0.40)
Tangibility -19.53 *** -20.59 *** -18.78 ***
(3.23) (3.32) (3.11)
Loan characteristics
Secured 29.68 *** 31.62 *** 32.00 ***
(3.52) (3.55) (3.63)
Numlenders -10.82 *** -8.54 ** -9.54 ***
(3.02) (2.31) (2.63)
Maturity 0.54 *** 0.40 * 0.41 **
(2.63) (1.95) (2.08)
Loansize -6.08 -7.39 * -7.15 *
(1.57) (1.93) (1.81)
Perfpricing -9.17 -10.15 -10.35
(1.13) (1.21) (1.24)
Covenants 9.86 12.80 12.48
(1.13) (1.43) (1.40)
Fixed e↵ects
Type Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Constant 85.76 180.32 *** 137.75 *
-1.22 -2.66 -1.82
adj. R2 0.66 0.66 0.67
N 999 999 999
Notes: The dependent variable is the loan spread. In column (1) KLD ESG strengths are included as an
interaction with bank ESG performance. In column (2) KLD ESG concerns are included as an interaction
with bank ESG performance. Column (3) includes both interactions simultaneously. Variable definitions can
be found in appendix 16. Standard errors are clustered on the bank-borrower relationship level. Absolute
values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *,
**, ***, respectively.
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time dynamics by splitting the sample around the crisis. The interaction term of this dummy
variable with borrower ESG measures reveals that the pricing of borrower sustainability is
stronger after the crisis, consistent with our expectation that the importance of borrower
sustainability for banks increased after the crisis.
Table 15: Time e↵ects
Year interactions Post crisis interactions
Dep. Spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time ⇥ ESG -15.52*** -129.25***
(4.31) (4.20)
Time ⇥ ENV -10.54*** -93.59***
(3.99) (4.20)
Time ⇥ SOC -10.57*** -94.08***
(4.02) (4.01)
Time ⇥ GOV -16.42*** -116.54***
(3.94) (3.18)
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Main e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Adj. R2 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57
Notes: The table shows the interaction borrower ESG performance with time. Columns (1) to (4) depict
time measured as years, while columns (5) to (8) employ a dummy variable that equals one when the year is
2009 or above, it is zero otherwise. All control variable are included from the previous multivariate regression
models, including loan and firm controls, fixed e↵ects, and the main e↵ects of the interactions. Absolute
values of the t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated by *,
**, ***, respectively.
5. Conclusion
This study reveals that although superior borrower sustainability performance reduces
loan spreads, this only holds true when the corresponding banks exhibit high sustainability
performance as well. Using sample splits, interaction e↵ects, propensity score matching,
as well as within-firm and within-bank identification methods I find that variation in loan
spreads due to sustainability performance of borrowers is only found when banks have high
sustainability performance. Disentangling the e↵ects reveals that the di↵erence in spreads
is based on a premium for borrowers with low sustainability performance rather than a
discount due to good sustainability performance. In other words, it appears that being more
sustainability is not beneficial, but rather it is a necessity in order to achieve desirable loan
spreads from banks that care about sustainability. From the ESG dimensions, governance
seems to be the predominantly important factor for banks, while environmental and social
are of similar importance. The measurement and comparability of governance has been
established for a longer time than environmental and social sustainability and hence may be
easier to integrate in the decision-making process. It is also likely to be of primary importance
to banks due to the contractual nature of the relationship with the borrowing corporation. A
borrower that has governance concerns and misaligned incentives may not ensure that capital
flows are employed to the best usage for the bank, but rather to the benefit of stakeholders
with stronger power, such as executives or directors.
This study provides first insights into the role of sustainability in the relationship between
banks and their borrowers and motivates further research into the area. Previous research has
so far focused on aggregate e↵ects, regardless of lender sustainability, however these results
indicate that the literature may benefit and improve causality inferences by disentangling
these e↵ects. This study is the first to our knowledge to show that the relationship between
sustainability and access to bank loan capital is driven only by more sustainable banks, that
the spread di↵erence is based on a premium rather than a discount, and also add to the
literature by using di↵erent approaches to gain an understanding of the causality behind
these findings.
The study has several limitations. First, the international representativeness of our results
remains to be tested, as our study is based on U.S. data.4 Although I attempt to achieve a
clean bank sustainability e↵ect by considering only loans with one lead arranger, the question
remains if and how other lenders within the syndicate and their sustainability performance
may a↵ect loan pricing.5 Furthermore, I recognize that ESG data may be subject to measure-
ment errors and validity concerns, as standardization and coverage or sustainability reporting
is still being developed. However the primary sustainability data in this study, Asset4, is one
of the highest quality datasets available for this purpose. In addition, this study considers
KLD data as an alternative measure for sustainability performance and uses a di↵erent mea-
surement of sustainability (dividing it in strengths and weaknesses in additions to an ESG
score). This provides me with su cient confidence on the validity of the data.
Another question that remains outstanding at this point is why borrowers with low sus-
tainability performance borrow from banks with high sustainability in the first place, if they
would be receiving better loan spreads from less sustainable banks. There can be several
possible explanations, including availability of banks and learning, that need to be inves-
tigated into. I address this issue in the section on selection to ensure that the results are
not driven by this. However understanding the matching between banks and borrowers is
an interesting topic that remains to be explored in the context of sustainability. A deeper
4For example, Hoepner et al. (2016) find that country sustainability scores, in particular environmental
sustainability, are associated with cost of debt.
5In untabulated analyses I use a cross-country sample with multiple lead arrangers and find similar results
using weighted-average lead arranger sustainability scores. Due to the trade-o↵ between bank sustainability
score precision and international representativeness, I decided in favor or precision and to focus on loans with
only one lead arranger, limiting our sample to the U.S. data.
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analysis of bank characteristics may be useful for this purpose. Furthermore, a thorough
analysis of the individual ESG factors and how their components drive the results will be
helpful to researchers and practitioners alike. I acknowledge the aforementioned caveats and
extended research questions and encourage future research to address these points.
Bank loans are the most important source of capital and yet to date we lack a clear under-
standing of the role of banks in whether and how they value the sustainability performance of
their borrowers. This study is one of the first to attempt to provide clarity on this matter by
taking into account both the bank and borrower side of the loan contract. This enables us to
pinpoint under which conditions sustainability performance is financially beneficial, provides
evidence on the underlying mechanisms, and o↵ers direction into relevant future research and
policy directions.
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Appendices
Table 16: Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
ESG criteria
ESG score
The equally weighted rating of environmental, social and
corporate governance performance.
Asset4
ENV score
The environmental pillar measures a company’s impact on
living and non-living natural systems, including the air,
land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects
how well a company uses best management practices to
avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental
opportunities in order to generate long term shareholder
value.
Asset4
SOC score
The social pillar measures a company’s capacity to generate
trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society,
through its use of best management practices. It is a re-
flection of the company’s reputation and the health of its
license to operate, which are key factors in determining its
ability to generate long term shareholder value.
Asset4
GOV score
The corporate governance pillar measures a company’s sys-
tems and processes, which ensure that its board members
and executives act in the best interests of its long term
shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity, through its
use of best management practices, to direct and control its
rights and responsibilities through the creation of incen-
tives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate
long term shareholder value.
Asset4
Borrower characteristics
Firm size
The natural logarithm of total assets, where assets are mea-
sured in million Euros.
Orbis
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes. Orbis
MTB (ratio) Market to book value. Orbis
Leverage (ratio) Debt to total assets ratio. Orbis
Pricevol Stock price volatility. Orbis
Tangibility (ratio) The natural logarithm of net tangible assets to total assets.Orbis
Rating (indicator) Firm’s long-term senior debt rating. DealScan
Loan characteristics
Spread Spread over the LIBOR, including any fees. DealScan
Secured (indicator) Indicator = 1 if the loan type is secured, 0 otherwise. DealScan
Numlenders Number of lending banks in the syndicate. DealScan
Maturity Natural log of the maturity of the loan facility in months. DealScan
Loansize
The firm’s tranche size measured as the natural logarithm
in thousand Euros.
DealScan
Perf. pricing (indicator)Indicator = 1 if performance pricing, 0 otherwise. DealScan
Covenants (indicator) Indicator = 1 if covenants attached to loan, 0 otherwise. DealScan
Loan type
Indicators that capture the type of loan e.g. term loan,
revolver, other.
DealScan
Loan purpose Indicators that capture the purpose of the loan. DealScan
Notes: The table provides variable definitions of the key variables. All variables are recorded at time t,
where t ranges from 2002 to 2015. Further information on the variables can be found from the respective
data sources.
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Table 18: Bank borrower matching
Variables N Mean spread Std. Dev. Di↵erence t-value
Total assets 331 15,200,000.00 38,700,000.00 686,403.90 0.21
282 14,500,000.00 42,900,000.00
EBIT 331 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.91
282 0.16 0.26
MTB 331 3.61 5.67 1.09 1.42
282 2.53 12.49
Leverage 331 28.70 18.59 2.08 1.40
282 26.62 18.18
Pricevol 331 27.91 7.86 -2.87 -4.25
282 30.78 8.87
Tangibility 331 0.39 0.21 -0.00 -0.12
282 0.39 0.21
Notes: The table shows the mean di↵erence in borrower characteristics for borrowers with below median
ESG scores that borrower from low vs. high ESG banks, respectively. The number of observations is
not balanced, as I do not re-split the sample into di↵erent sets of bank ESG scores after excluding high
sustainability borrowers. Instead, I use the former classification based on the entire sample, such that any
di↵erences in these subsamples remain evident. The unbalanced sample further indicates that borrowers
with lower sustainability performance have slightly more loans with low-sustainability banks rather than
high sustainability banks as expected.
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